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1. Paradoxes and Dilemmas 
 Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] 
[1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal 
and Sober [1991]): 
 i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally 
relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. 
 ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, 
 iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal 
representations, not their meanings. 
 Therefore it seems that if we want to defend the idea -absolutely plausible from an 
intuitive point of view- that mental / intentional states are causally responsible for 
behavioural outputs and we want to do it on the physicalist basis of any scientific 
methodology, we will have to give up the conviction that such intentional states qua 
intentional, i. e. as having a particular meaning, are the ones causally responsible for our 
behaviour. 
 The path that takes us to mental epiphenomenalism is clear: 1) the causal powers 
of any event are completely determined by its physical properties; 2) although intentional 
properties supervene on physical properties, they can’t be identified with them; 3) 
intentional properties, as intentional, are not causally responsible for behaviour, because 
they don’t take part in the causal powers of the states to which they belong, i. e., 
intentional properties are epiphenomenal. 
 Let’s consider now a different yet parallel position to the one just described. 
There is an important debate in cognitive science about whether the class of mechanisms 
to which we belong and which the computational modelling project of cognitive 
processes refers to is best represented by classical or connectionist approaches 
(McClelland, Rumelhart et. al [1986], Smolensky [1987] [1988], Fodor and Pylyshyn 
[1988], Pinker and Prince [1988], Clark [1989], Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart [1991], 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith [forthcoming]). 
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 In classical, serial processing models, information is encoded in terms of rules 
that have a linguistic character. In connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) 
models, the causal relationships among the units that constitute the system determine how 
the information is processes by the network, although these units don’t have a direct 
semantic interpretation. But, for both, classical and connectionist models, all the 
computations can be explained without any reference to the content of the processed 
information, i.e., in both cases the properties that seem to be responsible for the system’s 
behaviour are ultimately physical properties nor intentional ones. This situation mirrors 
thus, within cognitive science, the philosophical discussion concerning the causal 
efficacy of semantic properties. 
 Now, if in this debate we opt for the classical paradigm, there is a way of finding 
a solution to the computational version of the epiphenomenalism paradox. This solution 
is based mainly on the notion of supervenience or, more precisely, on the notion of 
mereological supervenience (Kim [1984] [1988])1 . The idea of intentional properties 
supervening on physical properties makes sense within the classical context because there 
exists an easily isolable supervenience base comprising the syntactic items in the so-
called language of thought. 
 But, what happens if we opt for the connectionist paradigm?. The situation here 
doesn’t seem to favour the use of the same supervenience strategy. For it has been argued 
(Ramsey, Stich and Garon [1991]) that beliefs, desires, and other mental states are nor, in 
the connectionist paradigm, individuable as weight or activation states of the system. This 
is because information is encoded by the network in distributed and superpositional 
representations, i.e., there are no straightforwardly isolable vehicles at the physical level 
that can be identified as the articulated supervenience base on which the semantic 
properties supervene2 . 
 If this is true, then the connectionist not only loses the battle against 
epiphenomenalism but more drastically, seems to offer a standing invitation to 
eliminativism, since talk of beliefs and desires, etc. now seems to be floating free of any 
acceptable scientific underpinning, i.e., she has lost the necessary theoretical apparatus 
for supporting the intuitive idea that propositional attitudes -beliefs, desires and any 
mental states with semantic content- are physically realized. This second line of 
argumentation doesn’t take us to a paradox but to a dilemma: either we accept 
eliminativism, if connectionist hypothesis are correct or we defend the causal efficacy of 
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mental states with semantic content by showing that, after all, connectionist networks are 
not plausible cognitive models (Davies [1991]). 
 From my point of view, however, both lines of argumentation need to be revised. 
The aim of this paper is to find an account of the causal efficacy of content that avoids 
the aforementioned epiphenomenalist objections and that doesn’t require the discovery of 
inner symbols in the computational modelling of such contentful mental states. In short, 
the aim is to find a meeting point where a philosophical story about content and cause 
and the connectionist computational model can be brought together (Cfr. Clark [1989]). 
2. Relevance versus Efficacy 
 How can we reconcile the fact that semantic level properties seem to be 
explanatorily relevant but not causally efficacious -inasmuch as the causal power of the 
states that have them lies in the micro-physical states that realise them?. 
 This problem involves a discussion of some of the most representative positions 
in cognitive science, basically those lumped together under the labels of the 
Representational Theory (Fodor [1975] [1987]) and the Syntactic Theory (Stich [1983], 
Churchland [1986] 1989]). The Representational Theory can roughly be characterised as 
the attempt to conceptualise mental states in terms of their relationships with some kind 
of representational entities -sentences written in some mental code or language of 
thought- that are then conceived as semantically interpretable and causally efficacious in 
virtue of their semantic content. Classic models in AI fit this kind of story nicely. 
 The core of the Syntactic Theory is, on the contrary, the idea that cognitive states 
can be systematically projected onto abstract syntactic objects, in such a way that the 
causal chains between stimuli and behavioural events can be described exclusively in 
terms of the syntactic properties and relations of these objects, without any need to appeal 
to their semantic content. It shouldn’t be a surprise then that the connectionist models 
appear in this case as providing the empirical support for defending the central thesis of 
the Syntactic Theory. 
 An exhaustive review of this philosophical / computational landscape, even one 
restricted to the specific topic of mental causation, is beyond the scope of this paper. My 
aim is much more modest. I intend to argue for the possibility of intentional laws with the 
help of conceptual tools which belong to the computational realm. After all -and although 
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this is not a thesis free of controversy- the question about whether a property P -semantic 
or not- is causally responsible for certain behaviour comes down to the question of 
whether or not there are causal laws involving P3 . Therefore, if it can be shown that there 
are causal laws covering semantic properties and if it can be done without appealing to 
any mental code or language of thought à la Fodor, the twofold aim will have been 
reached. 
 According to the preceding thesis, P is a causally responsible property if it is a 
property in virtue of which the individuals that instantiate it can be subsumed by causal 
laws. In order to be able to correctly hold that an event c has caused an event e there must 
be some properties F and G such that c instantiates F and e instantiates G and “‘F 
instantiations are sufficient for G instantiations’ is a causal law” (Fodor [1989], p. 64). 
 The ontological commitment underlying this thesis is the following. Only 
individual events can be causes. But, at the same time, the necessary character of the 
regularities expressed by a causal law depends on such regularities being established not 
between particular events, but between types of events. Now, since particular events can 
be referred to by many different expressions, some of which don’t mirror any of the 
properties that turn them into causes or effects of other events, the criteria for grouping 
together particular events into events of the same type -events of the type that can appear 
in a causal law- must only focus on those properties that can be shown to be causally 
efficacious. 
 For instance, although it might be true that the dinner on Sunday caused my 
stomach ache, the causal law on which such truth depends doesn’t state any relation 
between events of the type to have dinner on Sunday and stomach ache, but rather 
between events of a particular physical type, such as a certain composition of the meat 
and an alteration in the digestive juices. 
 In short, what makes a causal law a proper law, and not a mere regularity with 
enough statistical support, is the existence of a micro-physical mechanism or structure 
that is shared by the different macro-types of events that are subsumed by that law. In 
other words, a macro-type of events can be considered causally efficacious only if it 
supervenes on micro-physical events -perhaps different on different occasions- in such a 
way that the causal powers of the former are explained by the causal powers of the latter. 
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 When the matter is to individuate causal laws, it seems as if, strictly speaking, 
there were only micro-physical laws. The rest -all the laws of the so-called special 
sciences, such as Social Sciences, or the intentional laws of Psychology, based on the 
semantic content of mental states, are only approximate formulae that inevitably include 
ceteris paribus clauses. 
 The distinction suggested by Jackson and Pettit (Jackson and Pettit [1992]) 
between causal efficacy and causal relevance has its root in the same kind of 
considerations. The only difference is that what they call causal relevance is, from my 
point of view, an unlucky term to designate what I’ve named here explanatory 
relevance. 
 In effect, for Jackson and Pettit, both the causal stories at an intentional level and 
the causal laws with which the special sciences work are only causally relevant (or, in 
my terminology, explanatorily relevant), while the proper causal efficacy lies 
exclusively in the more basic micro-physical level. Their line of argument is similar to 
the one stated above. Only individual events described from a micro-physical point of 
view can be causes. Now, causal stories at a higher level don’t unfold in terms of singular 
events, but generalise over conjunctions and disjunctions of lower level events. 
Therefore, the causal laws that belong to these higher levels can only be true in virtue of 
the causal efficacy of the micro-physical events which the terms of the macro-physical or 
intentional vocabulary that appears in those laws refer to in the end. 
 Although persuasive, this line of thought places its profits into the epiphenomenal 
account that we wanted to settle. It can be granted to the realist scientist that nothing 
exists but the entities described by physics, but that doesn’t mean that we should devalue 
the causal status of those laws that don’t involve such entities. That would entail a 
misunderstanding of the very character of the scientific methods and explanations. In the 
next section, I try to resist this kind of argumentation through the defence of an anti-
reductionist thesis. 
3. Strict Laws and ceteris paribus Laws 
 Many philosopher now believe that the reductionist program has proved to be 
misguided (a good vindication of this anti-reductionist line can be found in The Scientific 
Image by Van Fraasen). Why should the semantic properties of our mental states appear 
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at a physical level?. Nobody expects to find them there. Thousands of objects of 
unquestionable existence -tables, mountains, hurricanes ... - don’t exist in the micro-
physical vocabulary and yet they aren’t devoid of their causal powers for that reason. The 
laws that let us predict the formation of a hurricane in the Pacific or that let us explains 
the consequences of such a formation, once they are reduced to a purely micro-physical 
vocabulary don’t mention any entity that can still be called a hurricane. And yet, sciences 
such as geology, meteorology and other equally respectable base their explanations in the 
existence of causal laws that connect phenomena described in the vocabulary of those 
sciences. 
 Especially relevant is the case of biology or chemistry. It is not the case that 
biologists or chemists hold that there is something beyond the physical processes 
underlying biological or chemical processes. It is just that explanations using terms as 
acid or alkaline, or variation and selection are good explanations in virtue of the 
existence of laws that relate properties whose causal efficacy only makes sense in the 
vocabulary of chemistry of biology. 
 The thesis that beliefs, desires and other mental states work as internal causes of 
behaviour and do it so in virtue of their semantic content can be justified by using the 
same kind of argument that has been used for the special sciences case. The desire for a 
cold beer plus the belief that the beer is in the fridge caused Andy to go to the kitchen and 
open the fridge. Or, in general, 
(x) (p) (q) [ ( x desires p) → ( x believes ( q → p ) ]→ ceteris paribus x brings about that 
q 
 This has been, for instance, the line of argumentation defended by Fodor in two 
important papers: “Making Mind Matter More” (Fodor [1989]) and “You Can Fool Some 
of the People All the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and 
Psychological Explanations” (Fodor [1991]). 
 In the first, Fodor shows how the legitimacy of causal laws formulated in terms 
that belong to a higher level than the micro-physical one is a problem that arises not only 
in psychology but in any of the non-basic or special sciences. This problem, however, 
doesn’t seem insoluble if we notice that the only difference between basic and non-basic 
causal laws is that, in the latter, there has to be a mechanism in virtue of which the 
satisfaction of the antecedent guarantees the satisfaction of the consequent or, in other 
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words, there has to be a mechanism that implements such laws. And the main point is: 
although the mechanisms that implement intentional laws -laws covering the content of 
mental states- have a physical character, the laws in themselves are essentially intentional 
and justify the ascription of causal efficacy to such states insofar they are semantically 
interpretable. 
 Now, the existence of physical mechanisms of implementation in the case of non-
basis laws, turns them into non-strict laws. These laws always involve ceteris paribus 
clauses and, therefore, the question that immediately arises is how it is possible to 
guarantee the ascription of causal efficacy to the semantic properties of the states 
subsumed by intentional laws when they unavoidably involve those clauses. 
The problem gets even worse if, on the basis of the multiple realizability of intentional 
states, we argue -as Schiffer does (Schiffer [1991])- that the very notion of ceteris 
paribus law doesn’t make any sense in psychology, among other reasons, because it is 
always possible to find significant exceptions to those laws, so significant as to make it 
impossible to determine their truth-conditions4 . 
 Fodor’s answer to this problem, developed in the second paper mentioned above, 
is complex and requires a certain amount of special terminology, but roughly it comes 
down to the following argument: 
a) It is assumed that any type of intentional state (A) in virtue of which an organism 
satisfies the antecedent of a ceteris paribus causal law is a functional state whose 
physical realization can be different in different organisms or in the same organism at 
different times. 
b) The fact that intentional laws incorporate ceteris paribus clauses shows that the 
causal efficacy of a type of intentional state (A) with regard to a certain behaviour (B) 
requires the joint existence of some of the possible physical realizations of that state and 
the additional conditions (C) that are clustered together under those clauses. In that way, 
if R1 is a realization of the event type A, such additional conditions would be represented 
by an arbitrary type of event C if: 
  i) A(R1) and C are (strictly) sufficient to bring B about. 
  ii) It is not the case that only A(R1) is sufficient to bring B about. 
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  iii) It is not the case that only C is sufficient to bring B about. 
c) According to this formulation, if R1 is a physical realization of the state A, there 
are three different ways in which the presence of R1 could involve, however, exceptions 
to the law “ceteris paribus A → B”: 
  i) First, when the additional conditions (C) that are necessary for the 
production of B, although determinable, don’t take place jointly with the realization of 
R1. We have then what Fodor calls a mere exception. 
  ii) Secondly, when there are no such additional conditions, i.e., when there 
is no event type C such that occurring jointly with the realization R1 of A constitutes a 
sufficient condition so as to bring B about. In this case, all tokens of A realized by R1 are 
absolute exceptions to the law. 
  iii) Finally, when the realization R1 of A is an absolute exception not only 
in regard to the law “ceteris paribus A → B”, but in regard to all laws in which A is the 
antecedent (“ceteris paribus A → D”, “ceteris paribus A → F”, etc). 
 According to Fodor, what distinguishes strict laws from ceteris paribus laws is 
that the latter may have exceptions, even absolute exceptions in the sense explained in ii). 
What distinguishes ceteris paribus laws from empty propositions is that in the former, but 
not in the latter, the physical realizations that correspond to the intentional states 
subsumed by the antecedent are not absolute exceptions to all laws in which the same 
antecedent appears, i.e. they are not absolute exceptions in the sense explained in iii). 
 The final justification of why such exceptions are not possible, i.e. the final 
justification of the nomological character of the ceteris paribus laws, despite the 
existence of the other types of exceptions, lies in the fact that, in the case of intentional 
laws, the notion of physical realization is defined functionally. Once this functional 
character is assumed, any physical state that was an absolute exception to the set of laws 
in which an intentional state A appears as antecedent, couldn’t simply be individualized 
as a realization of that intentional state, because there wouldn’t be any external criterion 
that let us determine what state we are talking about. The problem, then, is not so much a 
problem related to the possibility of ceteris paribus laws but rather a problem related to 
the correct functional individuation of the states that are covered by those laws. 
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 Let’s see how this strategy works in a concrete case. Let’s imagine there are only 
three laws in which the state “wanting to lose weight” appears as the antecedent. These 
laws are: 
- ceteris paribus people who want to lose weight put themselves on a diet. 
- ceteris paribus people who want to lose weight take some exercise. 
- ceteris paribus people who want to lose weight utter sentences of the kind “I’d love to 
lose a few pounds”. 
 Furthermore, let’s suppose that one of the physical realizations proposed for that 
state is to be in a neuronal configuration S and, finally, let’s imagine that people who 
happen to be in that kind of configuration are absolute exceptions to the three 
aforementioned laws, i.e., they are absolute exceptions to all the laws that involve the 
mental state “wanting to lose weight”. 
 As we’ve already seen, that means not only that, now and then, people who want 
to lose weight don’t put themselves on a diet, or don’t make any exercise, or don’t utter 
the sentence in question. It rather means that there are not additional conditions C1 such 
that if someone was in the neuronal configuration S and those conditions were met, then 
she would put herself on a diet, and there are no additional conditions C2 such that if 
someone was in the neuronal configuration S and those conditions were met, then she 
would take some exercise, and there are no additional conditions C3 such that if someone 
was in the neural configuration S and those conditions were met, then she would utter 
“I’d love to lose a few pounds”. 
 In this case, i.e., when there are no additional conditions that complete the state of 
being in a neuronal configuration S with respect to any of the laws in which “wanting to 
lose weight” appears in the antecedent, we have good reasons, not for questioning the 
nomological character of our generalizations, but to reject the idea that “to be in S” is the 
physical realization of “wanting to lose weight”. This is so because, after all, what 
defines the mental state “wanting to lose weight” is its function, and its function is to 
cause at least some of the behaviours mentioned in our example. In this way the only 
exceptions that might get the process of validating non-strict laws into trouble are ruled 
out. 
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 From my point of view, however, Fodor’s defence of the legitimacy of ceteris 
paribus laws is, in some sense, circular5 . The reason is the following. If the functional 
role of a representation or mental state is -at least according to a broad functionalist point 
of view- its causal role, a defence of ceteris paribus laws carried out as a way of 
guaranteeing the ascription of causal efficacy to the semantic properties of those states 
that rests, in the end, in their correct functional individuation (i.e. in their correct causal 
individuation) doesn’t seem to be the best of the possible defences. An equivalent 
argument, and equally circular, would be one that vindicated the validity of the law 
“ceteris paribus if it cuts glass, then it’s a diamond” by appealing to the fact that the 
functional individuation of what it is to be a diamond includes the property of being able 
to cut glass. 
 There is however an argument in favour of the legitimacy of ceteris paribus laws 
that doesn’t involved those problems. It is based on a definition of causation in terms of 
counterfactuals that has its origin in D. Lewis (Lewis [1986]) and on the vindication of a 
certain notion of supervenience that not only lets us account for the multiple realizability 
of the micro-physical structures underlying the same types of intentional states, but also 
does so by establishing a nomological relationship between the states so characterized. I 
turn now to this alternative approach. 
4. Counterfactuals and Supervenience 
 In its most basic formulation, a definition of causality in terms of counterfactuals 
can be given in the following way: 
 “If c and e are two actual events such that e would not have occurred without c, 
then  c is a cause for e” (Lewis [1986], p. 167). 
 Of course, this definition is in need of important provisos. Let’s suppose, for 
instance that a bright red piece of coal causes my cigarette to be lit. We might say that 
had the piece of coal not been bright red, the cigarette wouldn’t have lit. But, although 
that counterfactual is true, it doesn’t establish any kind of causal relationship between the 
properties of being bright red and being lit.  
 If we want to guarantee that the macro-properties used to describe events 
counterfactually connected in a putative causal explanation are really efficacious with 
respect to the described behavioural outputs, we need to establish some kind of 
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nomological connection between those macro-properties and the mechanisms that ensure 
their causal efficacy. That kind of connection is provided by the notion of supervenience 
or, more precisely, by the notion of mereological supervenience. This notion is expressed 
in its most general form by Kim in the following terms: 
“ ... the supervenience of a family A of properties on another family B can be 
explained as follows: necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F, 
then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily anything 
having G has F. When properties F and G are related as specified in the definition, 
we may say that F is supervenient on G, and that G is a supervenience base of F” 
(Kim [1984], p. 262). 
 Kim uses the notion of supervenience as his basic tool to argue against the 
epiphenomenal treatment of mental properties. Mental causation is nothing but a case of 
supervenient causation and, as such, the semantic properties of the mental states that 
come into supervenient causal relationships are causally efficacious (Cfr. Kim [1984] 
[1988]). 
 As I said before, what we need to guarantee that the macroproperties involved in 
the intentional explanations are causally efficacious is a nomological articulation 
between those properties and the mechanisms that implement them. Other formulations 
of Kim’s seem to be too weak in this sense, because they don’t require the existence of 
these bridge laws. However, paradigmatic cases of supervenience -cases such as being a 
liquid and causing dampness- require the setting up of those nomological relationships. 
 What was missing in these other definitions of supervenience is the constraint 
mentioned above, i.e., that a property is causally efficacious if it is a property in virtue of 
which the objects that instantiate it can be subsumed by laws, possibly ceteris paribus 
laws. And, in fact, it is this conjunction of positions what it seems to be behind Kim’s 
mereological supervenience, a notion that can only be understood as a type of 
supervenience that necessarily implies a nomological relation (Cfr. Segal and Sober 
[1991]). 
 If we now put together both the definition of causality in terms of counterfactuals 
and this notion of mereological supervenience, we can establish a sufficient condition to 
guarantee the causal efficacy of any macroproperty: 
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If 
 i) there is a causal law (possibly a ceteris paribus law) that connects type F events 
to type G events and that supports counterfactuals of the kind “G would not have 
occurred if F hadn’t taken place” and 
 “ii) in each case in which an F event causes a G event there exist micro-properties 
m(F) and m(G) such that the cause’s being m(F) causes the effect’s being m(G) and  
 iii) F mereologically supervenes on m(F) and G mereologically supervenes on 
m(G),  
then  
F is causally efficacious in the production of Gs” (Segal and Sober [1991], p. 10). 
 Once this condition has been formulated, the next step is to show that the 
semantic properties of mental states meets it. 
5. Cognitive and Computational Processes. 
 If we had to formulate a general aim for the set of disciplines that are clustered 
together under the label of cognitive science, it would probably be to specify the 
intentional laws that govern cognitive processes and to establish the kind of mechanisms 
that implement those laws. So the argument that takes us to a vindication of the causal 
efficacy of semantic properties, i.e. the argument that shows how semantic properties 
meet the condition developed in the last section, falls naturally under the umbrella of 
cognitive science. 
 The core of the argument lies in the characterization of cognitive processes as 
computational ones. Computational processes are defined, in turn, in terms of 
representations. Input-representations stand for arguments in a function. Output-
representations constitute the values of the computed function. A representation is thus a 
very special kind of physical configuration, a physical configuration that has a syntactic 
and a semantic reading. And the important point is that, although computer processes are 
only sensitive to the syntax, the machine can be designed in such a way that the 
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production of syntactic tokens makes sense given the semantic interpretation imposed by 
the problems that it is meant to solve. 
 In the classic paradigm frame, the image of the mind as a computer implies an 
interpretation of intentional states in terms of states that involve symbols of a mental 
language or Language of Thought (Fodor [1975]). My belief that there is an apple pie in 
the fridge implies my being in some kind of computational relation to the mentalese 
symbols corresponding to “There is an apple pie in the fridge”. The content of such an 
intentional state is just the content of that chain of symbols in mentalese and the fact that 
is a belief -instead of a desire or a doubt- is determined by the nature of its computational 
relation to the rest of my mental states and / or my behaviour. The symbols of that mental 
language possesses a combinatorial syntax and are physically implemented by the brain. 
Processes underlying relationships among intentional states are, in the end, physical 
processes. 
 Such an approach allows to establish causal laws that relate intentional states in 
virtue of their semantic properties. The nomological character of these relationships is 
guaranteed by the existence of those very same states at a lower level, a physical level 
that constitutes the supervenience base of the properties involved at the intentional level. 
Those laws will probably contain ceteris paribus clauses since alterations or failures at 
the physical level may prevent the correct working of the system, but as I’ve already 
argued, that is not an important problem. The relevant point is the existence of a adequate 
supervenience base and, under this view, that condition is met, since the supervenience 
base includes all those physical properties of representations that explain their causal 
powers at a micro-physical level. 
 The answer to the question whether or not there are intentional laws of the form 
“Every instantiation of P causes an instantiation of Q” (possibly with ceteris paribus 
clauses) where “F” refers to a semantic property is, in the light of this approach, clearly 
positive. The semantic properties of mental states can be seen as causally efficacious with 
respect to different behaviours, although the equivalent class to which they belong is not 
describable in terms of features that are projectable in a physical vocabulary. Of course 
there must be a physical description, as there has to be a physical implementation of the 
properties responsible for the semantic causation, but that physical characterization is not 
the relevant description for the explanation of their causal efficacy (Cfr. Horgan [1989], 
McLaughlin [1989]). 
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 Now, this computational approach represents a strategy according to which the 
ascription of causal efficacy to a certain intentional state requires some kind of vehicle -
located at the language of thought level- that can be seen as the modular item responsible 
for the information embodied in that state and as the item involved in all the cognitive 
processes in which that state plays a role. What can we say then about the connectionist 
paradigm in which such wehicles seem noticeably lacking?. 
 As I said in section 1, that question leads us to a dilemma: either we accept that 
connectionist models are inadequate as cognitive models or we have to adopt an 
eliminativist position with respect to propositional attitudes that is equivalent to deprive 
their content of any causal efficacy. In the rest of the paper I try to defend connectionism 
from both accusations by showing that the dilemma is, like so many, a false one. To 
accept connectionism as an adequate cognitive model doesn’t necessarily imply an 
eliminativist outcome provided that we are clear about the appropriate level of analysis of 
such computational models. 
6. Connectionism and Levels of Description 
 Connectionist models are complex networks of simple computational elements 
connected in parallel. Each one of these elements or units has an activation value that is 
established numerically as a function of both the activation values of other units in the 
network and the weight of the connections to those units. 
 The influence of an unit a over an unit b is the outcome of multiplying the 
activation value of unit a times the connection strength between a and b. Thus, if one unit 
has a positive activation value, its influence on the value of the adjacent unit would be 
positive if the connection strength is positive and negative if the connection strength is 
negative. In a clearly neurological reference, positive connections are called excitatory 
and the negative ones inhibitory. 
 A typical connectionist model has three set of units: input, output and the so 
called hidden units. The input representation is established by assiging activation values 
to the input units. This activation is propagated through the connections towards the 
hidden units until a set of activation values settles down in the output units. The 
computations that take place in the network to transform the input activity patterns into 
output activity patterns thus depend mainly on the set of connection strengths -
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determined according to a particular learning rule-. Those connections strengths are 
usually considered as responsible for the knowledge of the system and in that sense play 
the same role as programs in the classical paradigm ( Cfr. Smolensky [1988]). 
 Part of the interest of connectionist networks lies in their auto programming 
capacity, i.e., in the incorporation of learning procedures through which, after a certain 
training period during which the network is exposed to a bombardment of input / output 
pairs, the network adjusts the connection strengths and establishes the functions that the 
hidden units have to compute. 
 However, this is not the most relevant feature for our discussion. The crucial point 
is the distributed and superpositional character of representation in connectionist models. 
The mechanisms responsible for the input / output relationships in these models are the 
units that form the network. Each unit contributes to encoding information about different 
representations -that is what superpositional representation means- and each 
representation is thus distributed across a large set of microfeatures that are subsymbolic, 
i.e., that are not semantically interpretable.  
 As the network’s computations are completely determined by activity at the units 
level, and those units encode at the same time information of many different types, it is 
not possible to identify a stable and recurrent entity that corresponds to the classical 
notion of a symbol and that is handled by an independent processing system. At the same 
time, since the same information can be represented by networks with different units and 
connections, the class of networks capable of representing a fact P is nothing but a 
“chaotically disjunctive set” that doesn’t mirror at all the natural class that would result, 
according to folk psychology, by considering the set of cognitive agents that have a 
particular belief (Cfr. Clark [1990]). 
 The first step in the refutation of these arguments is a concession to the 
eliminativist: if the level of analysis used to explain the behaviour of connectionist 
models really is the units level, then the eliminativist conclusion is perfectly plausible. 
But, and this is the important point, a proper treatment of the connectionist paradigm -as 
a cognitive model- has to be developed at a level of description higher than that of mere 
numerical units and activations. 
 One of the first lessons learnt in cognitive science is that there are multiple levels 
of description with respect to a computational model. The election of one or other of 
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those levels places strong constraints upon the type of explanations that we can give 
about the system behaviour. It is not thus strange that, by restricting ourselves to the units 
and weights level, we get unsatisfactory explanations from the point of view of a 
semantically interpreted behaviour. 
 However, within this paradigm there are techniques of analysis that let us go up to 
a higher level of description, a level of description under which we can identify 
representations and transformations that have the same role as the representations and 
rules of the classical systems, although with a character completely different to that of 
classic symbols and algorithms since those representations and rules are implicit and 
highly distributed. 
 One of those techniques is cluster analysis. The basic idea of this statistical 
method is to extract regularities in the activation patterns of the hidden units for each one 
of the input-output relations and use them to build representations that group together 
relations with similar patterns. This technique lets thus unify under particular semantic 
categories activation patterns that, at the units and connections level, have a very 
different structure. And most important, it lets us establish a semantic unification of the 
outputs that are brought about by different inputs, i.e., it lets cluster together, according to 
their causal efficacy with respect to a particular behaviour, what at the units level are just 
different network states6 . 
 The same technique of cluster analysis shows that the part of the eliminativist 
argument that brings into question the existence of natural classes, in the psychological 
sense, is unnecessarily reductionist. The fact that different networks can represent the 
same information despite being constituted by sets of units with different activations and 
weights ceases to be a problem if the analysis of those networks is carried out at a level of 
description where the explanatory blocks are not so much the units but rather the 
clusterings of their activation patterns. Since these patterns are the result of grouping 
together different physical mechanisms that cause, however, the same output, the analysis 
of the system at this higher level of description lets us group what looked earlier like a 
“chaotically disjunctive set” into a single equivalence class (Cfr. Clark [1990]). 
 Thus, the cluster analysis technique plays, with respect to the problem of 
establishing the suitability of connectionism as a cognitive paradigm, the same role as the 
analysis developed above in terms of counterfactuals and supervenience played with 
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respect to the problem of mental causation. Both approaches offer the possibility of 
vindicating the causal efficacy of the semantic properties of mental / computational states 
despite the multiple realizability of the physical structures underlying those states. And, 
most important, the fact that this vindication is possible within the connectionist 
paradigm shows that the existence of modular items structured according to a classical 
syntax and semantics is not an empirical constraint essential to the success of the 
computational strategy. 
 To see this, reflect that the process of symbolic labelling of the activation patterns 
of the units in a connectionist network is a process that is carried out from outside the 
system. The patterns by themselves, are not symbolic in any sense comparable to the 
classic notion of symbol. They are not comparable from a semantic point of view because 
those patterns only represent sets of microfeatures and not atomic symbols. They are not 
comparable from a syntactic point of view because the combinatorial operations over 
those patterns are not governed by linguistic-type rules but by exclusively mathematical 
computations. This notwithstanding, their function is to characterize the information 
represented by the hidden units activation, the information that is causally responsible for 
the system’s behaviour. 
 The characteristics of this Second Computational Metaphor (Bates and Elman 
[1992]) represented by the connectionist paradigm have only been sketched, but even a 
brief discussion like this one gives us the necessary theoretical tools to complete the other 
half of the aim of this paper. It shows that it is possible to justify philosophically the 
causal efficacy of the content of mental states without having to embrace a computational 
strategy that postulates the existence of discrete symbolic items. And, therefore, that it is 
possible to save connectionism from the false dilemma threatener by the eliminativist / 
epiphenomalist arguments. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 A variety of different problems concerning the causal efficacy of content have 
now been displayed. The resulting picture can be sketched as follows. There is a certain 
philosophical paradox about the causal powers of our intentional states. Although it is 
perfectly reasonable to think that what we think is causally responsible for what we do, a 
more fine-grained philosophical analysis seems to show that those mental states must be 
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pictured as epiphenomenal; a situation mirrored within the computational arena of 
cognitive science. 
 The first task was to develop an account of the causal efficacy of content that 
avoids this epiphenomenalist paradox. In order to do that we used the Davidsonian 
strategy of addressing the question about the causal role of any property P in terms of the 
existence of causal laws involving P (section 2). But once the scenario is set up in that 
way, it seems that the only strict laws possible are the micro-physical laws. The rest, the 
laws of the special sciences includes ceteris paribus clauses and are therefore only 
approximate formulations. An anti-reductionist argument that tries to reduce this big gap 
between strict laws and ceteris paribus laws is developed in section 3. There I pay special 
attention to Fodor’s arguments in Fodor [1991] and try to highlight what looks like a 
typical circularity mistake in his defence of the legitimacy of those laws. 
 In section 4 I develop an alternative defence using as key notions the notion of 
counterfactual and of mereological supervenience. Once these two notions have been 
explained, a sufficient condition to guarantee the causal efficacy of any macroproperty is 
formulated. And, in order to show that semantic properties also meet that condition a 
computational approach is developed in section 5. 
 The outcome of the computational characterisation of cognitive processes used in 
this approach seems to imply however that we really do need to be able to isolate 
physical items of some kind to act as vehicles -in the supervenience base- for the higher 
level semantic properties. We then faced a dilemma insofar as connectionist approaches 
then threatened to lead to eliminativism. In section 6 I showed that the correct analysis of 
such models needs to be conducted at a higher syntactic level (which is what techniques 
like cluster analysis provide). Once the correct level of description is found, the 
explanation of the behaviour of these models can avoid both the epiphenomenalist 
paradox and the eliminativist dilemma. 
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1  The notion of supervenience was originally introduced by G. E. Moore in his 
characterization of the relations between evaluative and descriptive properties. That 
evaluative properties supervene on descriptive properties means that there is no 
difference in the former withouth a difference in the latter. In this general sense, the 
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notion of supervenience is a variation of the general thesis that states that physical facts 
determine all the facts. In section 4 I’ll offer a more detailed treatment deriving from the 
influential work of Jaegwon Kim. 
2  A distributed representation is one constituted by a set of microfeatures, which are 
subsymbolic, i.e., which are not semantically interpretable themselves. When the same 
unit or units that contribute to encode information involved in one representation also 
contributes to encode information involved in many other representations, we say that the 
representations are superpositional. 
3  Davidson’s influence in the way of addressing this question should be clear. His 
anomalous monism, i.e., the idea that mental events come into causal relationships only 
under their physical description because this is the only description in which they are 
subsumed by laws, involves the aforementioned thesis. 
4  Schiffer’s position is, briefly that i) the defense of intentional laws is absolutely 
implausible once the multiple physical realizability of mental states is taken into account 
and that ii) nevertheless, the explanatory power and predictive character of intentional 
theories don’t depend at all on the existence of such laws with or without ceteris paribus 
clauses. The second of these two thesis is also held by A. Clark, although his line is more 
behaviouristic in character. Cfr. Clark [1993]. 
5  This “sense”, which I will immediately develop, is different from Schiffer’s 
criticisms about circularity. Schiffer’s criticisms are, I think, satisfactorily answered by 
Fodor at the end of his paper. Cfr. Fodor [1991], pp. 31- 33. 
6  If the network is complex enough, as in the case of NETtalk (Seijonski and 
Rosenberg [1986]) -that turns written text into phonemes- that partitioning of the 
representational space will have a tree-shape hierarchical structure. In this net, the final 
partition between consonant and vowel is justified by the fact that the activation patterns 
that work as representations for each one of the consonants are more similar to each other 
than those that work for each one of the vowels. In turn, within the consonant group, the 
activation patterns corresponding to the phonetic feature palatal, for instance, can be 
grouped together as such because the similarity among them is higher than the one among 
the patterns corresonding to, let’s say, labial or nasal.  
